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Abstract 
The head is thought to be rational and cold, whereas the heart is thought to be emotional and 
warm. Eight studies (total N = 725) pursued the idea that such body metaphors are widely 
consequential. Study 1 introduced a novel individual difference variable, one asking people to 
locate the self in the head or the heart. Irrespective of sex differences, head-locators 
characterized themselves as rational, logical, and interpersonally cold, whereas heart-locators 
characterized themselves as emotional, feminine, and interpersonally warm (Studies 1-3). Study 
4 found that head-locators were more accurate in answering general knowledge questions and 
had higher GPAs and Study 5 found that heart-locators were more likely to favor emotional over 
rational considerations in moral decision-making. Study 6 linked self-locations to reactivity 
phenomena in daily life – e.g., heart-locators experienced greater negative emotion on high 
stressor days. Study 7 manipulated attention to the head versus the heart and found that head-
pointing facilitated intellectual performance, whereas heart-pointing led to emotional decision-
making. Study 8 replicated Study 3’s findings with a nearly year-long delay between the self-
location and outcome measures. The findings converge on the importance of head-heart 
metaphors for understanding individual differences in cognition, emotion, and performance. 
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Lakoff and Johnson (1999) suggested that conceptual metaphors guide thought, emotion, 
and behavior in a hitherto unappreciated manner. Since then, significant progress has been made 
in documenting the importance of conceptual metaphors in the social psychology literature 
(Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010). For example, positive evaluations are faster when perceptual 
manipulations are consistent with prominent metaphors (e.g., “good is up”: Meier & Robinson, 
2004a). Social judgments, too, are influenced by metaphor-consistent manipulations. For 
example, manipulations of physical warmth lead to “warmer” interpersonal judgments (Williams 
& Bargh, 2008a) and moral judgments are more severe when individuals are placed in dirty 
rooms, consistent with “dirt” metaphors for moral depravity (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 
2008). 
Metaphor representation theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) might have profound 
implications for personality psychology, but there is surprisingly little research of this type 
(Robinson & Fetterman, in press). There are at least two potential reasons for this largely 
missing interface. First, conceptual metaphors (e.g., “good is up”, “friendly is warm”, “immoral 
is dirty”) are consensually shared by members of a culture (Lakoff, 1986), are largely universal 
across cultures (Kövecses, 2000), and therefore may constrain thinking and behavior in a similar 
manner across individuals (Landau et al., 2010). Second, manipulations (e.g., of dirt, warmth, or 
higher vertical position) are potentially irrelevant in understanding individual differences, which 
are not commensurate with manipulation effects (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). Considerable 
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creativity, therefore, is necessary for translating the metaphor representation theory to the 
individual differences realm (Robinson & Fetterman, in press). 
Despite these obstacles, we believe that metaphor representation theory may have 
profound implications for personality psychology. If people think and behave in metaphoric 
terms (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Landau et al., 2010), then such processes should be as relevant 
in understanding individual differences as in understanding manipulation effects. We introduce a 
novel assessment device and, in doing so, capitalize on the fact that people ascribe very different 
metaphoric functions to the head versus the heart. 
Head versus Heart Metaphors 
The self is not just a psychological entity, but also a multi-faceted body structure – it has 
hands, feet, genitals, a head, etc. Two body parts – the head and the heart – have been ascribed 
particular psychological significance throughout the history of Western civilization. Plato (trans. 
1987) was among the first to suggest that the head is the source of rational wisdom, whereas the 
heart is the source of the passions. Philosophers and writers subsequent to Plato have elaborated 
on the purported significance of the head versus the heart in understanding rational thinking, 
emotional responding, and decision making, but in a way that preserves Plato’s presumed 
functions for these two body organs. Similar heart and head metaphors pervade the work of 
Shakespeare, for example, but also many other writers (Swan, 2009). 
In our daily lives, too, we frequently make references to the head or the heart. To “use 
one’s head” means to think rationally and logically about a problem, whereas to “lose one’s 
head” means to lose the capacity for clear thinking. The organ located in the head – the brain – is 
also used to characterize intelligence (e.g., “he has a brain”, “she is brainy”). On the other hand, 
to be “stuck in one’s head” suggests a lack of social connection and we certainly stereotype 
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brainy individuals as more interested in intellectual problems than in other people. Common 
metaphors for the head, then, suggest greater rationality and intelligence, albeit in combination 
with some lack of social connection. 
Metaphors for the heart appear to be two-fold. As indicated above, the head and the heart 
are frequently contrasted with each other in their purported functions (Swan, 2009). Further, 
heart metaphors are common in characterizing greater levels of emotionality (Kövecses, 2000). 
To “follow one’s heart” means to let emotions dictate one’s life choices. A person has 
“heartache” to the extent that he or she ruminates and dwells upon adverse personal events. On 
the other hand, a different class of metaphors links the heart to greater social connection and 
caring. A person “has a heart” to the extent that he/she cares about others. Such caring 
individuals are also characterized as “having a big heart” or “having a warm heart”. In sum, 
metaphors for the heart suggest both its role in emotionality in general and caring in particular. 
A Novel Individual Difference Measure and Hypotheses 
Most common metaphors (including those for the head and the heart) are likely to be 
strongly shared within a culture (Lakoff, 1986) and cross-culturally shared as well (Kövecses, 
2000). From one perspective, such consensual associations render it uncertain whether 
conceptual metaphors may be explanatory in the personality realm (Landau et al., 2010; 
Robinson & Fetterman, in press). From another perspective, though, the consensual nature of 
conceptual metaphors can be capitalized on. Of importance to the current investigation, if the 
head is rational and the heart is emotional (Swan, 2009), then forcing individuals to choose 
whether the head or the heart is the predominant locus of the self may be of great value in 
predicting numerous outcomes consistent with head versus heart metaphors. 
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Accordingly, we developed a novel individual difference measure. Respondents were 
forced to pick the head (brain) or the heart as the better location of their own self. In this context, 
the self is the abstract concept (i.e., the “target”) and a body organ is the concrete entity (i.e., the 
“source”) used to think about the self. If the self-location measure functions as other metaphoric 
effects that have been demonstrated (Landau et al., 2010), then we might expect head- and heart-
locators to possess some of the characteristics that we metaphorically associate with these body 
organs. In Study 1, we hypothesized that heart-locators – relative to head-locators - would report 
greater emotionality. In Study 2, we hypothesized that head-locators would favor rational 
thinking styles, whereas heart-locators would favor experiential thinking. In Study 3, we 
hypothesized that head-locators would report greater levels of interpersonal coldness, whereas 
heart-locators would report greater levels of interpersonal warmth. In Study 4, we hypothesized 
that head-locators would have higher GPAs. In Study 5, we hypothesized that heart-locators, 
relative to head-locators, would solve moral dilemmas in an emotional manner. In Study 6, we 
hypothesized that heart-locators would exhibit greater negative emotional reactivity to daily 
stressors. In these studies, a number of additional hypotheses were made as well and we save 
them for the relevant introduction, results, and discussion sections. In general terms, though, we 
expected head-locators to be rational, intelligent, and interpersonally cold, whereas we expected 
heart-locators to be emotional, attentive to their emotions, and interpersonally warm. 
In Study 7, we manipulated attention to the head versus the heart by asking individuals to 
point to the head versus the heart. Head-pointers were hypothesized to answer general 
knowledge questions more accurately, whereas heart-pointers were hypothesized to solve moral 
dilemmas in a more emotional manner. Although our general focus was on individual differences 
in self-location, this study is an important one from a causal-experimental perspective. Study 8, 
Self-Location 7 
 
finally, returns to individual difference predictions, but in the context of a long time delay 
between self-location assessments and outcome measures. Study 8, relative to Studies 1-6, can 
therefore better support the dispositional nature of self-locations and their predictive importance. 
Study 1 
Study 1 introduces the self-location measure. The head and the heart are both viewed as 
sources of wisdom in common metaphors. For this reason, we expected a relatively even split of 
heart-locating and head-locating individuals. Women are both viewed and view themselves as 
more emotional in nature (Robinson & Clore, 2002). For this reason, and because the heart is the 
purported organ of emotionality, we hypothesized that women, relative to men, would be more 
likely to think of the self as located in the heart. 
Irrespective of sex differences, heart-locating individuals were hypothesized to have 
higher levels of affect intensity, defined in terms of greater levels of emotionality quite generally 
(Larsen, Diener, & Emmons, 1986). To “have a heart” suggests greater levels of caring and 
empathy. Accordingly, we hypothesized that heart-locators would score higher in psychological 
femininity, which is primarily defined in such terms (Bem, 1974). On the basis of similar 
considerations, we hypothesized that heart-locators would report liking intimacy-related 
activities to a greater extent as such activities, too, are marked by and facilitate caring relations 
with others (McAdams, Diamond, de St. Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997). 
Method 
Participants and General Procedures 
Participants were 112 (47 female) undergraduates from North Dakota State University 
(NDSU) seeking course credit. Laboratory sessions included groups of 6 or less and all measures 
were completed on personal computers using MediaLab software. Participants in Study 1, as in 
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Studies 2-5, were told that they would be completing a number of different tasks, some related to 
perceptions and others related to different aspects of personality. 
The Self-Location Measure 
Participants were asked the following question: “Irrespective of what you know about 
biology, which body part do you more closely associate with your self (choose one)?” The 
irrespective lead-in was useful in focusing individuals on intuitive ideas about the self. 
Participants were to choose the “Heart” or the “Brain”, which were presented as vertically 
aligned buttons toward the top of the computer screen. The measure contrasted the heart and the 
brain because both are internal body organs and therefore commensurate for this reason. For the 
sake of consistency with prominent metaphors (Swan, 2009), though, we refer to heart-locators 
versus head-locators in characterizing the results. Choices were made by moving a mouse cursor 
– placed at center screen – toward the relevant button and then making a left-mouse click. To 
render the self-location measure strictly comparable across people, and therefore facilitate 
individual difference comparisons, it was deemed best that the item be exactly the same for 
everyone. This was accomplished by always placing the heart-related option immediately above 
the head-related option. 
The self must have a head and it must have a heart. Yet, the self-location question is 
surprisingly easy to answer. For example, when we ask this question in presentations, people 
have no difficulty answering the question. Moreover, they find their answers to the question so 
intuitive that they cannot imagine themselves answering the question in any other way than they 
did. This is likely due to three factors. The conceptual self is identified with the body (Robinson, 
Mitchell, Kirkeby, & Meier, 2006). Yet, it is not identified with all areas of the body equally 
(Burris & Rempel, 2004) and the head and the heart are spatially quite distinct, thereby rendering 
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it quite likely that there is more of the (metaphorical) self’s essence in one body part relative to 
the other. Of most importance, however, there are very prominent metaphors for the head and the 
heart that are, in some cases, diametrically opposed to each other (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; 
Swan, 2009). Participants, then, presumably answer the question by drawing from the intuitive 
notion that the self is located somewhere in the body (Burris & Rempel, 2004) and the part of the 
body in which the self is more likely located is consistent with prominent metaphors for the head 
versus the heart (Swan, 2009). 
Outcome Measures 
Heart-locators were hypothesized to be higher in affective intensity. A shortened version 
of the Affect Intensity Measure (AIM: Larsen et al., 1986) was administered to examine this 
prediction. Participants were asked to rate how characteristic (1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 5 = 
extremely characteristic) 10 statements from the AIM (e.g., “My emotions tend to be more 
intense than those of most people”) generally characterize the self. The shortened scale was 
reliable (M = 3.09; SD = .62; Cronbach’s Alpha = .76).1 
Heart-locators were also hypothesized to be higher in psychological femininity. A 
shortened version of Bem’s (1974) femininity scale was administered. Participants were asked to 
rate how true (1 = never or almost never true; 7 = always or almost always true) 10 descriptors of 
femininity (e.g., “affectionate”) were of their personalities. Items were chosen such that they 
focused on interpersonal warmth and caring in particular terms. The shortened version of the 
femininity scale was reliable (M = 4.82; SD = .89; Alpha = .86).
2 
Heart-locators were hypothesized to like intimacy-related activities to a greater extent. 
We could not locate a self-report scale that was as focused as desired and so we created our own. 
Each of the 13 items started with the phrase “I like” followed by an activity posited to be 
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intimacy-related in nature (e.g., “helping people”, “sharing my feelings”). Participants indicated 
their level of agreement with each item in relation to a six-point scale (1 = disagree; 6 = agree). 
The measure was reliable (M = 4.47; SD = .77; Alpha = .84).
3 
Results 
We viewed it plausible that individuals would differ quite dramatically in whether they 
viewed the self as a heart- or head-related entity. In fact, 52% of the participants in Study 1 
viewed the self as a heart-related entity and 48% viewed the self as a head-related entity. There 
was thus an even split among responders. On the other hand, women (relative to men) should be 
more likely to view themselves as heart-related beings. This hypothesis was supported in a chi-
square analysis, χ² = 4.75, p < .05, in that the percentage of women choosing the heart organ was 
64%, whereas the percentage of men choosing the heart organ was 43%. 
Prominent metaphors suggest that the heart, relative to the head, is the seat of 
emotionality. Accordingly, we expected heart-locators to score higher in affect intensity. This 
hypothesis was supported in a one-way ANOVA, which revealed that heart-locators scored 
higher in affect intensity (M = 3.31) than head-locators (M = 2.85) did, F (1, 110) = 16.98, p < 
.01, partial eta square = .13. On the other hand, there was a sex difference in self-location, as 
indicated above. Accordingly, for this outcome measure – and others below – we performed a 
multiple regression in which self-location (-1 = head; +1 = heart) and participant sex (-1 = male; 
+1 = female) predictors were simultaneously regressed. Both Self-Location, b = .29, t = 3.44, p < 
.01, and Participant Sex, b = .39, t = 4.63, p < .01, predicted affect intensity with their 
overlapping variance statistically controlled.
4 
Prominent metaphors suggest that the heart, relative to the head, is associated with caring 
and empathy. Because these qualities are characteristic of psychological femininity, we expected 
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heart-locators to score higher in femininity. This proved to be the case in a one-way ANOVA, as 
femininity scores were higher among heart-locators (M = 5.23) than head-locators (M = 4.38), F 
(1, 110) = 33.23, p < .01, partial eta square = .23. In a multiple regression, both Self-Location, b 
= .39, t = 5.27, p < .01, and Participant Sex, b = .47, t = 6.35, p < .01, predicted psychological 
femininity with their common variance statistically controlled. 
Metaphorically, people who “have hearts” are intimate in their interpersonal functioning. 
Accordingly, we hypothesized that heart-locators would like engaging in intimacy-related 
activities (e.g., “sharing my feelings”) to a greater extent. In fact, heart-locators (M = 4.81) did 
report liking these activities to a greater extent than head-locators (M = 4.11), F (1, 110) = 28.79, 
p < .01, partial eta square = .21. In a multiple regression controlling for overlapping variance, 
both the Self-Location variable, b = .36, t = 4.84, p < .01, and Participant Sex, b = .49, t = 6.67, p 
< .01, predicted greater liking for intimacy-related activities. Correlations among the Study 1 
measures are displayed in Table 1. 
Discussion and Study 2 
All of the hypotheses of Study 1 were supported. We found a relatively even split of 
heart-locators and head-locators. Further, though, we found that women, relative to men, were 
more likely to locate the self in the heart, results consistent with women’s greater valuing of their 
emotions (e.g., Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). We note that very similar 
results occurred in Studies 2-6 and in Study 8; for this reason, we omit similar material in the 
other interim discussion sections. 
Of perhaps more importance, we found that heart-locators had higher levels of affect 
intensity, results consistent with the heart’s purported role in emotional reactivity (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999). We found that heart-locators had higher levels of psychological femininity, 
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results consistent with the heart’s metaphoric role in caring for others (Swan, 2009). We found 
that heart-locators liked intimacy-related activities to a greater extent, results consistent with the 
idea that intimacy draws from the heart’s functions (e.g., “talking from the heart”: Kövecses, 
2000). The self-location variable predicted the outcome measures independently of participant 
sex and the results cannot therefore be ascribed to participant sex. Our self-location variable is 
nonetheless an entirely novel one to the personality literature and we therefore examined its 
predictive validity in multiple additional studies. 
Study 2 focused on new outcome measures not examined in Study 1. People “following 
their hearts” presumably do so because they value their emotions to a greater extent (Kövecses, 
2000). If so, we should expect a systematic relationship between the self-location variable and 
valuing the self’s emotions. The attention to emotion scale of Salovey et al. (1995) seeks to 
assess just such individual differences. Accordingly, we hypothesized that heart-locators would 
score higher in attention to emotion. 
Metaphors for the heart/head distinction primarily reference different thinking styles 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Specifically, a heart-based thinking style is intuitive (“follow your 
heart”), whereas a head-based thinking style is rational (“use your head”). Epstein (1994) 
contrasted such thinking styles, which are in fact central to the decision making literature 
(Kahneman, 2003). Pacini and Epstein (1999) then created a rational-experiential inventory to 
assess individual differences in preferences for these thinking styles. We hypothesized that heart-
locators would prefer experiential thinking, whereas head-locators would prefer rational 
thinking. A double-dissociation of this type would greatly contribute to our understanding of 
individual differences in self-location. 
Method 
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Participants, Procedures, and the Self-Location Measure 
Participants were 117 (55 female) undergraduate students from NDSU seeking course 
credit. They were told that they would be completing a number of different tasks and 
questionnaires on computer. Sessions were conducted in groups of 6 or less and data were 
collected using MediaLab software. The self-location question was the same as in Study 1. 
Outcome Measures 
Participants completed the attention to emotion measure of Salovey et al. (1995). It 
presents individuals with 13 statements (e.g., “I pay a lot of attention to how I feel”) that are 
rated for their accuracy in characterizing the self (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). 
Greater attention to emotion is consistent with valuing emotions to a greater extent (Palmieri, 
Boden, & Berenbaum, 2009). The scale was reliable (M = 3.57; SD = .52; Alpha = .77). 
As indicated above, Pacini and Epstein (1999) created an inventory to assess individual 
differences in experiential and rational thinking styles. Each scale is composed of two subscales, 
one assessing preferences and the other assessing abilities. Our interest was in preferences for 
these two thinking styles and we therefore administered these preference-related items. 
Participants were asked the extent to which a series of 20 statements characterize the self (1 = 
definitely not true of myself; 5 = definitely true of myself). There were 10 experiential items 
(e.g., “I like to rely on my intuitive impressions”) and 10 rational items (e.g., “I enjoy intellectual 
challenges”). These scales have proven their worth in recent studies (e.g., Koele & Dietvorst, 
2010). Both the experiential (M = 3.33; SD = .50; Alpha = .71) and rational (M = M = 3.27; SD = 
.62; Alpha = .78) scales were reliable. 
Controlling for Openness to Experience 
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 Individual differences in self-location are assessed in a very different manner than 
standard trait measures are. For example, the self-location measure does not directly ask people 
whether they are generally emotional, rational, warm, or anything of the sort. For such reasons, it 
also seems unlikely to us that individual differences in self-location can be equated with standard 
personality trait measures, which do in fact ask people direct questions about their personality 
tendencies (Pervin, 1994). Regardless, and although we will have more to say about such points 
later, it may be of utility to begin to make an empirical case for discriminant validity. 
 In personality psychology, there is now striking agreement on the fundamental traits of 
personality. These consist of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and 
openness to experience (John & Srivastava, 1999). These “big 5” traits organize and account for 
covariations between more specific trait measures (McCrae & Costa, 1999). For example, 
aggression is a variant of (low) agreeableness. In establishing discriminant validity for a new 
predictor like self-location, it can often be useful to control for a big 5 trait of most relevance to 
the outcomes assessed. In Study 2, openness to experience should be relevant to the outcomes 
because open people characterize themselves as deeper thinkers in both emotional and non-
emotional realms (McCrae & Costa, 1999). We therefore assessed openness to experience (M = 
3.44; SD = .54; Alpha = .76) using the well-validated 10 item scale of Goldberg (1999), which 
has a five-point (1 = very inaccurate; 5 = very accurate) rating format. Goldberg’s big 5 scales 
correlate very highly with alternative big 5 scales (John & Srivastava, 1999). 
Results 
Primary Results  
The proportion of individuals choosing the heart (52%) versus the head (48%) as the 
location of the self was identical to Study 1. Thus, individuals differ dramatically and evenly in 
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responding to this question. The percentage of women locating themselves in the heart was 62%, 
whereas the percentage of men locating themselves in the heart was 44%. A chi-square analysis 
of 2 (sex) x 2 (location) frequency counts replicated Study 1 in finding that sex was a significant 
predictor of heart versus head self-locations, χ² = 3.90, p < .05. 
A one-way ANOVA examined attention to emotion scores as a function of self-location. 
As hypothesized, heart-locators were higher in attention to emotion (M = 3.51) than head-
locators (M = 3.10) were, F (1, 115) = 22.34, p < .01, partial eta square = .16. A multiple 
regression was then performed. Controlling for the overlap of the self-location and participant 
sex variables, both Self-Location (-1 = head; +1 = heart), b = .33, t = 4.20, p < .01, and 
Participant Sex (-1 = male; +1 = female), b = .38, t = 4.81, p < .01, predicted attention to emotion 
scores. Thus, variations in self-location constitute a novel predictor of valuing one’s emotions. 
Heart-locators should also prefer experiential thinking to a greater extent. This hypothesis 
was confirmed in a one-way ANOVA in that experiential preferences were higher among heart-
locators (M = 3.44) than head-locators (M = 3.21), F (1, 115) = 6.51, p < .05, partial eta square = 
.05. Pacini and Epstein (1999) found that a preference for experiential thinking was higher 
among women. This was so in the present study as well, but a multiple regression revealed Self-
Location, b = .19, t = 2.14, p < .05, and Participant Sex, b = .21, t = 2.28, p < .05, to be 
independent predictors of preferences for experiential thinking. 
Thus far, we have reported results concerning outcome measures that should be higher 
among heart-locators. A preference for rational thinking, though, should be higher among head-
locators. This hypothesis was confirmed in a one-way ANOVA in that rational thinking 
preferences were higher among head-locators (M = 3.42) than heart-locators (M = 3.13), F (1, 
115) = 6.52, p < .01, partial eta square = .05. Of additional importance, Pacini and Epstein 
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(1999) found that a preference for rational thinking styles was not sex-linked. This was true in 
the present study as well. In a multiple regression, Self-Location predicted such preferences, b = 
-.25, t = -2.72, p < .01, whereas Participant Sex did not, b = .11, t = 1.14, p > .25. See Table 2 for 
correlations among the Study 2 measures. 
Controlling for Openness to Experience 
 As can be seen in Table 2, openness to experience predicted all of the outcomes of Study 
2. We therefore performed multiple regressions in which we controlled for levels of this 
personality trait. After doing so, the Self-Location measure still predicted the attention to 
emotion, b = .22, t = 5.22, p < .01, experiential thinking, b = .13, t = 2.84, p < .01, and rational 
thinking, b = -.18, t = -2.26, p < .05, outcomes. Thus, discriminant validity was demonstrated 
with respect to openness to experience, the big 5 trait most relevant to the Study 2 outcomes. A 
further point can be made: Openness to experience did not predict self-locations (see Table 2) 
and therefore the self-location measure is not an alternative openness to experience measure. 
Discussion and Study 3 
The outcomes of Study 2 were different than those examined in Study 1 and generally 
focused on preferences for ways of feeling and thinking. Heart-locators reported paying greater 
attention to their emotions. Although doing so is sometimes functional (Salovey et al., 1995), it 
can be problematic in the context of ruminative tendencies (Gohm, 2003). Heart-locators also 
indicated a preference for intuitive-experiential thinking styles. This result is impressive in light 
of suggestions that this mode of thinking is not well-captured by trait-related conceptions of 
personality (Epstein, 1993). 
Study 2 was the first to posit an outcome that should be higher among head-locators. As 
predicted, head-locators reported liking intellectual challenges to a greater extent. Subsequent 
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studies will pursue the question as to whether head-locators are intellectually more skilled. For 
now, it is important to note that we were able to support a double-dissociation of thinking 
preferences in that heart-locators liked experiential thinking to a greater extent, whereas head-
locators liked rational thinking to a greater extent. It is remarkable how well these results map 
onto metaphors linking the heart to intuitive thinking and the head to rational thinking 
(Kövecses, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Swan, 2009). 
Study 3 sought to further establish a case for double-dissociations. Building on the results 
of Study 2, we would expect heart-locators to describe themselves as more emotional and head-
locators to describe themselves as more logical. In examining such predictions, we created 
purpose-built self-report scales. Building on the results of Study 1, we would expect heart-
locators to describe themselves as interpersonally warm and head-locators to describe themselves 
as interpersonally cold. In addition to purpose-built scales of warmth and coldness, we also 
administered a trait scale assessing agreeableness and hypothesized that levels of this trait would 
be higher among heart-locators than head-locators. Coldness, from an interpersonal perspective, 
should not be interpreted in terms of level-headedness or introspective tendencies, but rather in 
terms of less successful and antagonistic relationships with others (Moskowitz, 2010). 
 Method  
Participants, Procedures, and the Self-Location Measure 
Participants were 97 (53 female) undergraduate students from NDSU seeking course 
credit. They were told they would be asked a variety of different questions on computer. The 
self-location measure was the same as in Studies 1 and 2. 
Outcome Measures 
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All outcome measures asked individuals whether they possessed certain personality 
attributes. In all cases, participants were asked the extent to which different statements accurately 
describe the self (1 = very inaccurate; 5 = very accurate). The instructions and rating scale were 
those of the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006). We first sought to 
contrast emotional versus logical personal qualities. Three statements assessed emotionality (e.g., 
“I am emotional”). The scale was very reliable (M = 3.63; SD = .91; Alpha = .86). Three 
additional statements assessed the extent to which the individual could be described as logical 
(e.g., “I am logical”; M = 3.75; SD = .79; Alpha = .80). We second sought to contrast 
interpersonal warmth versus coldness. Three statements assessed warmth (e.g., “I am warm; M = 
4.15; SD = .71; Alpha = .87) and three assessed coldness (e.g., “I am cold; M = 1.81; SD = .71; 
Alpha = .70). 
Finally, participants completed Goldberg’s (1999) 10 item broad-bandwidth scale of 
agreeableness (e.g., “I sympathize with others’ feelings”). This scale correlates strongly with 
other big 5 agreeableness scales (John & Srivastava, 1999) and has been proven valid in many 
previous studies (e.g., Meier & Robinson, 2004b; Robinson & Gordon, 2011). The scale was 
reliable (M = 3.95; SD = .66; Alpha = .86). Concretely, agreeableness is an inverse predictor of 
anger and aggression (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008), a robust predictor of cooperation in 
experimental studies (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997), and it also predicts healthier and longer-
lived personal relationships (Smith, Glazer, Ruiz, & Gallo, 2004). 
Controlling for Trait Neuroticism 
 Study 3 included the big 5 trait of neuroticism for two reasons. First, we sought to 
examine whether neuroticism is related to self-locations. Second, neuroticism can be 
conceptualized as a type of emotionality, albeit one of a distress-related type (Watson, 2000). 
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Controlling for neuroticism might be useful in establishing that heart-locators are emotional, but 
not because they are neurotic. We also controlled for neuroticism in follow-up analyses 
involving the other outcomes as well. Neuroticism was assessed using Goldberg’s (1999) scale, 
which has a range of 1 to 5 (M = 2.68; SD = .73; Alpha = .85). 
Results 
Primary Analyses 
The percentage of individuals locating the self in the head (52%) versus heart (48%) 
represented a nearly even split. As in Studies 1 and 2, a majority of women were heart-locators 
(62%), whereas a minority of men were (32%). A chi-square analysis confirmed a significant 
relation between participant sex and self-location, χ² = 8.92, p < .01. 
Heart-locators should describe themselves as more emotional than head-locators. This 
prediction was confirmed in a one-way ANOVA (Ms = 3.89 & 3.39 for heart- & head-locators), 
F (1, 95) = 7.76, p < .01, partial eta square = .08. In a multiple regression, both Self-Location, b 
= .20, t = 1.99, p < .05, and Participant Sex, b = .24, t = 2.40, p < .05, predicted self-ascribed 
emotionality. By contrast, head-locators should describe themselves as more logical than heart-
locators. This was also the case (Ms = 3.93 & 3.55 for head- & heart-locators), F (1, 95) = 5.91, 
p < .05, partial eta square = .06. In a multiple regression, Self-Location (-1 = head; +1 = heart) 
predicted such self-characterizations, b = -.25, t = -2.37, p < .05, whereas Participant Sex did not, 
b = -.02, t = -0.21, p > .80. 
Interpersonal warmth should be higher among heart-locators. This prediction was 
confirmed in a one-way ANOVA (Ms = 4.35 & 3.96 for heart- & head-locators), F (1, 95) = 
7.71, p < .01, partial eta square = .08. In a multiple regression controlling for participant sex, 
Self-Location was a marginal predictor of warmth, b = .19, t = 1.92, p < .10, and Participant Sex 
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was a significant predictor, b = .27, t = 2.68, p < .01. On the other hand, head-locators should 
characterize themselves as higher in interpersonal coldness and they did (Ms = 1.99 & 1.61 for 
head- & heart-locators), F (1, 95) = 7.47, p < .01, partial eta square = .07. In a multiple 
regression, Self-Location predicted interpersonal coldness, b = -.23, t = -2.26, p < .05, whereas 
Participant Sex did not, b = -.12, t = -1.14, p > .25. 
We finally hypothesized that heart-locators would score higher in agreeableness. This 
prediction was confirmed (Ms = 4.18 & 3.74 for heart- & head-locators), F = 11.85, p < .01, 
partial eta square = .11. In a multiple regression, Self-Location was a significant predictor of 
agreeableness, b = .27, t = 2.67, p < .01, as was Participant Sex, b = .22, t = 2.23, p < .05. In 
summary, multiple hypotheses from Study 3 were supported. Table 3 reports correlations among 
the measures. 
Controlling for Neuroticism 
 As shown in Table 3, the big 5 trait of neuroticism did not predict self-locations. Thus, 
results involving the self-location variable should not be ascribed to this trait. Perhaps a stronger 
case for this point can be made by controlling for neuroticism in multiple regressions.  
When controlling for neuroticism, the Self-Location measure remained a significant predictor of 
the emotional, b = .27, t = 3.20, p < .01, logical, b = -.20, t = 2.50, p < .05, warm, b = .19, t = 
2.71, p < .01, and cold, b = -.18, t = -2.67, p < .01, outcomes, as well as agreeableness, b = .22, t 
3.40, p < .01. Thus, heart-locators are emotional, but not in a neurotic big 5 sense. 
Discussion and Study 4 
The major goal of Study 3 was to build on Study 2 in establishing further double-
dissociations involving whether individuals view themselves as head- or heart-centric beings. 
Consistent with a first set of hypotheses, heart-locating individuals characterized themselves as 
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more emotional, whereas head-locating individuals characterized themselves as more logical. 
Consistent with a second set of hypotheses, heart-locating individuals characterized themselves 
as warmer people, whereas head-locating individuals characterized themselves as colder people. 
These results, like those involving the experiential and rational scales of Study 2, suggest that 
our self-location assessment has considerable utility to the personality literature in contrasting 
types of people, at least with respect to double-dissociations. 
Of further importance, we were able to establish that heart-locating individuals scored 
higher in agreeableness, an important trait in understanding individual differences in 
interpersonal functioning (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008; 2010). In Study 6, we will further 
examine the role of self-locations in interpersonal functioning. Study 4, however, has a different 
purpose. Head-locating individuals, we suggest, may not only like intellectual activities more, 
but actually perform better in such activities. The rationale for this prediction is that more 
intelligent people, when thinking about the self, would be more likely to choose the body organ 
(i.e., the head) linked to intelligent performance. If so, we might expect them, relative to heart-
locating individuals, to have higher GPAs. Furthermore, we might expect them to exhibit a 
greater degree of accuracy in answering general knowledge questions – a good, though not 
perfect, marker of intellectual capacity (Jensen, 1998). 
Method 
Participants, Procedures, and the Self-Location Measure 
The same self-location assessment used in Studies 1-3 was used in Study 4 as well. 
Participants were 82 (38 female) undergraduate students from NDSU seeking course credit. They 
were told that they would respond to a series of very different questions on computer. As in the 
prior studies, sessions involved groups of 6 or less. 
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Outcome Measures 
Participants were presented with 10 medium difficulty true/false general knowledge 
questions drawn from a popular Internet quiz website. They tapped historical knowledge 
(“Aphrodite is the Greek Goddess of War”: false), geographic knowledge (“Australia is the only 
continent that is also a country”: true), natural world knowledge (“There are over 20 colors in the 
rainbow”: false), real-world knowledge (“A stop sign is an octagon”: true), and vocabulary 
knowledge (“A bootlegger is someone who sells cigars”: false). The general knowledge 
questions were balanced such that five were true and five were false. For each statement, 
participants were to type “t” for true or “f” for false. The problems were in fact of medium 
difficulty in that the average accuracy rate was 79% (SD = 13%). 
Participants were asked to report on their high school GPA and then their current college 
GPA. For both questions, they typed in a number with two decimal places (e.g., “3.23”). 
Previous research has shown that students have very accurate memories for their GPAs, even 
many years later (Bahrick, Hall, & Berger, 1996). Such estimates were therefore treated as likely 
veridical. High school GPA is an excellent predictor of college GPA, as it was in the present 
study. We therefore averaged across the two items (M = 3.13; SD = .48; Alpha = .72). Please 
note that these are objective (or nearly so in the case of reported GPA) outcomes and therefore 
immune to concerns as to whether reported self-locations might prime outcome responses. In this 
study, too, the outcomes were reported before the self-location measure was completed. 
Results 
There was a relatively even split of participants choosing the heart (54%) versus the head 
(46%) as the location of the self. A majority of women choose the heart as the location of the self 
(66%), whereas a minority of men did (46%). A chi-square analysis revealed that participant sex 
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was a marginally significant predictor of self-location, χ² = 3.02, p < .10. Added to the findings 
of Studies 1-3, however, there is little doubt concerning the robust nature of this sex difference. 
We hypothesized that head-locators would possess greater general knowledge. To 
examine this prediction, we performed a one-way ANOVA on general knowledge accuracy rates. 
Head-locators were more accurate in answering these questions (M = 83%) than heart-locators 
were (M = 77%), F (1, 80) = 5.44, p < .05, partial eta square = .06. There is no compelling reason 
for thinking that general knowledge varies by sex, but a multiple regression was performed 
nonetheless. Self-Location continued to predict general knowledge performance with participant 
sex controlled, b = -.23, t = -2.09, p < .05, whereas Participant Sex was a non-significant 
predictor, b = -.11, t = -0.96, p > .30. 
We also hypothesized that head-locators would possess higher GPAs. This prediction was 
confirmed in a one-way ANOVA (Ms = 3.27 & 3.05 for head- & heart-locators), F (1, 80) = 
4.39, p < .05, partial eta square = .05. In a multiple regression, Self-Location remained a 
significant predictor of GPAs, b = -.23, t = -2.05, p < .05, whereas Participant Sex was a non-
significant predictor, b = .00, t = 0.04, p > .95. See the top panel of Table 4 for correlations 
among the variables. 
Discussion and Study 5 
Study 2 found that head-locators liked intellectual activities to a greater extent. Study 3 
found that head-locators characterized themselves as more logical. Such results, though, might 
reflect preferences rather than actual intellectual abilities or achievements. In Study 4, we were 
able to show that head-locators both (a) possess greater general knowledge and (b) have higher 
GPAs. The former measure’s strength is its link to general intelligence (Jensen, 1998), whereas 
the latter measure’s strength is its characterization of a long history of performance in the 
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classroom. Taken together, the two findings of Study 4 complement each other in suggesting that 
head-locators appear to be somewhat more able in intellectual tasks and realms. 
The results of Study 2 are suggestive of the idea that heart-locators may favor emotional 
considerations in social decision making, whereas head-locators may favor rational 
considerations in this same context. Study 5 sought to provide direct support for this idea. Such 
different modes of decision making can be excellently contrasted in moral dilemma scenarios 
(Bartels, 2008; Greene, 2011). In such dilemmas, an action by the self (e.g., to suffocate and kill 
a screaming baby) is emotionally aversive, but would result in a greater good to a larger number 
of people (e.g., by saving members of the community from hostile invaders). We hypothesized 
that heart-locators would solve such dilemmas in an emotional fashion, whereas head-locators 
would solve such dilemmas in a rational fashion. 
Method 
Participants, Procedures, and the Self-Location Measure 
The Study 5 sample consisted of 127 (53 female) participants from NDSU seeking course 
credit. The study was again described as involving responses to very different questions, sessions 
consisted of groups of 6 or less, and data were collected by MediaLab software on personal 
computers. The self-location measure was the same one administered in Studies 1-4. 
Outcome Measure 
We presented participants with five classic moral dilemmas.
5
 We shortened the longer 
scenarios in favor of a briefer and more intuitive presentation of the key features of each 
dilemma. One scenario read as follows: 
You are an inmate in a concentration camp. A sadistic guard is about to hang your 
son who tried to escape and wants you to pull the chair from underneath him. He 
Self-Location 25 
 
says that if you don’t he will not only kill your son but some other innocent 
inmate as well. You don’t have any doubt that he means what he says. What 
would you do? 
Responses for this scenario were q = “I would NOT pull the chair” and p = “I would pull the 
chair”. The first response is the emotional one as it is driven by aversion to the idea of killing 
one’s own son (Greene & Haidt, 2002). The second response is the rational one in that it would 
save an innocent person and one’s son would die in either case. We scored rational responses as 
0 and emotional responses as 1 and then averaged across scenarios (M = .52; SD = .25). 
Controlling for Conscientiousness 
 Conscientious people tend to be more thoughtful in their decision making (McCrae & 
Costa, 1999) and the outcome for this study related to decision making. For such reasons, we 
assessed the big 5 trait of conscientiousness and did so using Goldberg’s (1999) 
conscientiousness scale (M = 3.51; SD = .65; Alpha = .84). 
Results 
A relatively equal percentage of participants chose the heart (48%) versus the head (52%) 
as the locus of the self. The percentage of men choosing the heart was 41%, whereas the 
percentage of women choosing the heart was 58%. A chi-square analysis confirmed a significant 
association between participant sex and self-locations, χ² = 3.99, p < .05. 
The hypothesis of Study 5 was that heart-locators, relative to head-locators, would be 
more likely to solve moral dilemmas in an emotional manner. This prediction was confirmed in a 
one-way ANOVA, F (1, 126) = 4.13, p < .05, partial eta square = .03. On average, 53% of the 
dilemmas were solved in an emotional manner by heart-locators and 44% of the dilemmas were 
solved in an emotional manner by head-locators. In a multiple regression, Self-Location was a 
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marginally significant predictor of emotional decision making, b = .16, t = 1.85, p < .10, whereas 
Participant Sex was a non-significant predictor, b = .12, t = 1.39, p > .10. 
As shown in the bottom panel of Table 4, there was no systematic relationship between 
conscientiousness and the self-location measure. Further, when controlling for conscientiousness 
in a multiple regression, the Self-Location measure was a significant predictor of emotional 
responses to the moral dilemmas, b = .25, t = 2.26, p < .05. All told, we have now provided 
evidence that self-locations cannot be viewed as substitutes for the big 5 traits of openness, 
neuroticism, or conscientiousness. Additional related points will be made in the General 
Discussion. 
Discussion and Study 6 
The purpose of Study 5 was to pit emotional against rational considerations in social 
decision making. An excellent way of doing so is in the context of moral dilemmas in which one 
can actively harm another person, which is emotionally aversive, but in doing so save the lives of 
a greater number of people (Greene & Haidt, 2002). We found evidence that participants locating 
their selves in their hearts were more likely to solve such dilemmas in an emotional manner. This 
relationship, although significant in zero-order terms, was marginally significant with participant 
sex controlled. Accordingly, it was deemed best to replicate such findings in Study 6. 
In addition, Study 6 had another purpose. To the extent that individual differences in self-
location are substantive and important, they should predict responses to relevant events in daily 
life (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003; Tennen, Affleck, Armeli, & Carney, 2000). We regard self-
locations as potentially consequential to such everyday reactions. Accordingly, Study 6 was a 
daily diary study in which participants reported on daily events and potential reactions to them. 
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On the basis of prior findings, and particularly those of Studies 1-3, we focused on the potential 
role of our self-location variable in moderating two event-outcome relationships. 
First, our prior studies suggest that heart-locators should be more emotionally reactive. 
For example, Study 1 found that heart-locators scored higher in affect intensity and Study 3 
found that heart-locators described themselves as more emotional. In daily diary protocols, 
emotional reactivity is typically examined in terms of negative emotional reactions to daily 
stressors (Compton et al., 2008; Suls & Martin, 2005; Tennen et al., 2000). We therefore 
assessed daily stressors and negative emotional experiences and hypothesized that higher levels 
of daily stress would predict higher levels of daily negative emotion to a greater extent among 
heart-locators than head-locators. Findings of this type would validate our suggestion that heart-
locators are more emotionally reactive. 
The second focus of the daily diary study was on a reaction that should be stronger 
among head-locators. Study 3 found that head-locators characterized themselves as cold and 
scored lower in agreeableness. There is considerable evidence that cold and disagreeable 
individuals react to provocation with higher levels of antisocial behavior or aggression 
(Bettencourt, Telley, Benjamin, & Valentine, 2006; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010). Thus, we 
hypothesized that head-locators, relative to heart-locators, would act in a more antisocial fashion 
when provoked in their daily lives. Findings of this type would validate our suggestion that head-
locators are disagreeable. Note that Study 6 examines reactions to social events and is not 
focused on the idea that head-locators are more logical or rational, which cannot be easily 
assessed in daily diary protocols. 
Method 
Participants, Laboratory Assessments, and Procedures 
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Participants registered for a two-part daily diary study. The first part was to be completed 
in the laboratory. In groups of 6 or less, 66 (25 female) NDSU participants receiving course 
credit (or monetary compensation for the daily protocol) completed the same self-location 
measure used in prior studies. They then responded to the same moral dilemmas used in Study 5. 
Again, rational choices were scored 0, emotional choices were scored 1, and we averaged across 
the five scenarios (M = .52; SD = .25).
 
Subsequent to the laboratory session, participants completed a 14 day diary protocol. 
Email reminders were sent to participants each morning at 9 a.m. Each daily survey was posted 
on the Internet after 5 p.m. and removed at 8 a.m. the next morning. In this way, we ensured that 
daily reports encompassed the day in question and could not be completed at a later time. The 
protocol automatically dropped people from the study if they had missed 4 of the daily reports. 
Among the completers of the study, compliance averaged 74% (range = 9-14 reports), for a total 
of 684 reports. 
In previous studies, the self-location measure was completed in the same assessment 
session as the dependent measures. Such procedures render it possible that the relations obtained 
might depend on state-related factors or potential order effects. Such considerations are not 
relevant in relation to the daily outcomes of Study 6. There was at least a 3 day delay between 
completion of the laboratory portion of the study and the first daily survey, the self-location 
measure was one of many completed in the laboratory, the daily protocol was described 
generically, and the daily outcome predictions were subtle and unlikely to be discerned. 
Therefore, findings involving the daily outcomes should bypass concerns related to state-related 
effects or order effects, though this issue will be revisited in Study 8. 
Daily Diary Survey and Analysis Strategy 
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The daily diary survey had to be brief because longer surveys would dissuade individuals 
from completing their daily reports (Bolger et al., 2003). Nonetheless, we sought to ensure that 
each daily assessment involved multiple items. We first assessed the extent (1 = not at all; 5 = 
extremely) to which the participant felt two markers of negative emotion (“distressed” & 
“nervous”) on each day. These markers were chosen from the PANAS negative affect scale 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and have proven valid in previous studies of daily stress-
reactivity (Compton et al., 2008). The daily negative emotion scale was reliable, as determined 
by first averaging across days and then performing a reliability analysis (M = 1.86; SD = .88; 
Alpha = .64). We therefore averaged across items, as we did for the other daily measures as well. 
We then assessed antisocial behavior with a three-item survey that has proven reliable 
and valid in previous daily diary studies (e.g., Palder, Ode, Liu, & Robinson, in press). In 
specific terms, participants were asked the extent (0 = not at all true today; 3 = very much true 
today) to which they engaged in three antisocial behaviors (“argued with someone”, “insulted 
someone”, & “criticized someone”) on each day (M = .57; SD = .69; Alpha = .76). The daily 
outcome measures were assessed first to prevent their potential contamination by prior reports of 
daily events (Compton et al., 2008). 
We then assessed the extent to which (1 = not at all true today; 4 = very much true today) 
four stressful events occurred each day (“had a deadline to worry about”, “had a lot of 
responsibilities”, “not enough time to meet obligations”, & “too many things to do at once”). 
Previous daily diary studies have shown that these particular stressors are common among 
undergraduate student populations and are predictive of negative emotions in daily life (Bresin, 
Fetterman & Robinson, 2012; Compton et al., 2008). The scale was reliable (M = 2.18; SD = .83; 
Alpha = .83). Finally, participants reported on the extent to which (1 = not at all true today; 4 = 
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very much true today) they had been provoked each day in relation to two items (“someone 
argued with me” & “someone hurt my feelings”). These items have also been used in previous 
daily diary studies (e.g., Wilkowski, Robinson, & Troop-Gordon, 2010) and they constituted a 
reliable scale (M = 1.59; SD = .74; Alpha = .68). 
In analyzing the daily diary data, we followed standard procedures. Heart-locators 
received a score of +1, whereas head-locators received a score of -1 (Aiken & West, 1991). The 
two event types – stressors and provocations – were person-centered such that their mean was 0 
and their standard deviation was 1 (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). Intercepts and slopes were treated 
as random rather than fixed effects because they were hypothesized to vary across individuals 
(Tabachnic & Fidell, 2007). Analyses were based on multi-level modeling procedures, which are 
optimally suited for hypotheses and designs of the present type (Christensen, Barrett, Bliss-
Moreau, Lebo, & Kaschub, 2003). Singer (1998) has advocated the use of the SAS PROC 
MIXED procedure for multi-level modeling analyses and we followed Singer’s 
recommendations for using this procedure.
6 
Results 
Laboratory Results 
The percentage of individuals choosing the heart (48%) versus the head (52%) as the 
locus of the self was almost exactly equal. Thus, self-locations are bifurcated in a manner that is 
noteworthy and potentially informative to multiple individual difference literatures. There was 
some tendency for women (M = 64%) relative to men (M = 39%) to view the heart rather than 
the head as the locus of the self, χ² = 3.89, p = .05, replicating prior findings. 
As in Study 5, we predicted that heart-locators (head-locators) would solve moral 
dilemmas in an emotional (rational) manner more frequently. This prediction was confirmed in a 
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one-way ANOVA with Self-Location as the independent variable, F (1, 64) = 7.94, p < .01, 
partial eta square = .11 (Ms = 44% & 61% for head- & heart-locators respectively). In a multiple 
regression, both Self-Location, b = .24, t = 2.15, p < .05, and Participant Sex, b = .36, t = 3.21, p 
< .05, predicted the proportion of emotional resolutions to the dilemmas. 
Daily Diary Results 
A first multi-level modeling (MLM) analysis examined daily variations in negative 
emotion as a function of daily stressors, self-location, and their cross-level interaction. The 
predictors explained a significant amount of variance in negative emotion levels, χ² = 264, p < 
.01. Consistent with the idea that stressors are a major cause of daily negative emotion (Watson, 
2000), there was a main effect of Daily Stressors, b = .28, t = 6.19, p < .01. We hypothesized that 
heart-locators would exhibit greater reactivity to daily stressors, but not more intense negative 
emotions even on low stressor days. Consistent with such ideas, there was no main effect for 
Self-Location, b = .01, t = .11, p > .90. Consistent with the reactivity hypothesis, however, there 
was a significant cross-level interaction, b = .09, t = 2.09, p < .05. 
To understand the nature of the interaction, estimated means (Aiken & West, 1991) were 
calculated for low (-1 SD) versus high (+1 SD) stressor days for head-locators (-1 SD) and heart-
locators (+1 SD). These estimated means are displayed in the top panel of Figure 1 and suggest 
that stress/negative emotion relations were stronger among heart-locators than head-locators. The 
relation between daily stressors and daily negative emotions was significant among both head-
locators, b =.19, t = 3.83, p < .01, and heart-locators, b = .37, t = 5.30, p < .01, but was clearly 
stronger among heart-locators. That is, heart-locators exhibited greater negative emotional 
reactivity to stressors in daily life. 
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A second MLM analysis examined antisocial behaviors as a function of daily 
provocations, self-location, and their cross-level interaction. The predictors explained a 
significant amount of variance in antisocial behaviors, χ² = 260, p < .01. Consistent with the idea 
that interpersonal provocation is a major cause of antisocial behavior (Berkowitz, 1993), there 
was a main effect for Daily Provocations, b = .43, t = 8.25, p < .01. We hypothesized that head-
locators would act in an antisocial manner when provoked, but not necessarily in the absence of 
provocation. There was in fact no main effect for Self-Location, b = -.02, t = -.32, p > .70. Of 
more importance, there was a significant cross-level interaction, b = -.12, t = -2.09, p < .05.
7 
To understand the nature of this second cross-level interaction, estimated means were 
calculated for low (-1 SD) versus high (+1 SD) provocation days for head-locators and heart-
locators separately considered. These estimated means are displayed in the bottom panel of 
Figure 1 and they suggest that the relation between provocation and antisocial behavior was 
stronger among head-locators than heart-locators. Daily levels of provocation predicted 
antisocial behavior among both heart-locators, b = .33, t = 4.14, p < .01, and head-locators, b = 
.54, t = 7.83, p < .01, but this relationship was clearly stronger among head-locators. 
Discussion and Study 7 
The most important laboratory result of Study 6 was that we were able to replicate the 
idea that heart-locators resolve moral dilemmas in an emotional manner. Accordingly, we 
suggest that heart-head metaphors (Kövecses, 2000; Swan, 2009) are far more than figures of 
speech. Rather, they govern or at least predict social decision making in cases in which 
emotional and rational considerations are in conflict. An additional purpose of Study 6, and one 
that we (e.g., Robinson & Neighbors, 2006) and others (e.g., Bolger et al., 2003; Tennen et al., 
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2000) view as particularly important, was to demonstrate that personality or individual difference 
variables have demonstrable consequences for understanding daily functioning. 
In particular terms, we sought to show that heart-locators are more emotionally reactive 
to daily stressors, a result that would greatly extend the Study 3 finding that heart-locators 
described themselves as emotional. Additionally, we sought to show that head-locators act in an 
interpersonally cold or disagreeable manner when provoked (Smith, et al., 2004), a result that 
would greatly extend the Study 3 finding that head-locators described themselves as 
interpersonally disagreeable. 
Both such daily diary predictions were confirmed. As might be expected, higher levels of 
daily stressors led to higher levels of daily negative emotion, but importantly such relations were 
stronger among heart-locators. Additionally, higher levels of daily provocation led to higher 
levels of antisocial behavior, but importantly such relations were stronger among head-locators. 
Heart- and head-locators, then, are reactive to different types of events, in relation to different 
outcomes, but in a manner suggesting that heart-locators are more emotionally reactive, whereas 
head-locators are disagreeable in their interpersonal functioning. 
Thus far, our results have been correlational in nature. This is not a problem, but rather a 
strength, from an individual differences perspective. On the other hand, manipulation studies 
may resolve some ambiguities and we deemed it useful to include such a study. Therefore, Study 
7 sought to manipulate attention toward the heart or the head in an experimental manner. This 
manipulation randomly assigned participants to two conditions, one in which people were 
surreptitiously led to point to the head and one in which they were surreptitiously led to point to 
the heart. As indicated below, the manipulation was subtle and its effects cannot therefore be 
ascribed to semantic priming effects. Additionally, the manipulation did not require participants 
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to locate the self in either body organ and was subtle in this manner too. Asking people to locate 
the self in the head or the heart prior to the outcomes was deemed potentially too high in demand 
characteristics. Nonetheless, and given that the self is psychologically a bodily entity (Burris & 
Rempel, 2004; Robinson et al., 2006), we thought it likely that the self would “travel” to the 
organs pointed to and influence outcomes for this reason. 
In understanding the effects of this manipulation, we decided to focus on two outcomes. 
First, we examined whether this manipulation would influence decision making in moral 
dilemmas of the type used in Studies 5 and 6. We hypothesized that heart-pointers would resolve 
such dilemmas in more emotional terms. Second, we hypothesized that head-pointers would 
answer general knowledge questions – of the sort assessed in Study 4 – more accurately. The 
latter result would be remarkable if performance on such questions is solely determined by 
crystallized intelligence (Buehner, Krumm, Ziegler, & Pluecken, 2006), but there are in fact 
precedents for the idea that priming factors can influence performance on such questions (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis, Bargh, & Miedema, 2000). Accordingly, and because the head is the metaphoric 
locus of intellectual knowledge (Swan, 2009), head-pointing may improve general knowledge 
performance, in Study 7 as a function of metaphoric processes. 
Method 
Participants and General Procedures 
Participants consisted of 74 (42 female) undergraduates from NDSU seeking course 
credit. The study was generally described as one involving a number of unrelated tasks. 
Participants completed the study on personal computers in groups of 6 or fewer. 
Manipulation 
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Upon entering the laboratory, all participants were informed that we were interested in 
how people answer questions when using their dominant or non-dominant hands. They were 
further told that they were in the non-dominant hand condition. We emphasized the fact that 
people often end up using their dominant hands, even when instructed not to do so, because 
doing so is such a habitual occurrence. To prevent this possibility, we stated, it was necessary to 
occupy the dominant hand with another task. Accordingly, the dominant hand, and particularly 
its index finger, was to be placed on a part of the body to preclude its use while answering 
questions on the computer. 
Participant sessions were randomly assigned to one of the two metaphor-related 
conditions. In the head condition, participants were told to place their dominant index fingers on 
the corresponding side of the temple. We did not mention the word “head” because we wanted to 
avoid semantically (or verbally) priming this word. The experimenter modeled this placement 
and ensured that dominant index fingers were placed appropriately. In the heart condition, 
participants were told to place their dominant index fingers over the left portion of the upper 
chest. The experimenter modeled this placement and ensured that dominant index fingers were 
touching this body area, which contains the heart. In both conditions, participants were instructed 
to continue the gesture while answering questions. 
Dependent Measures 
We obtained a set of 8 true-false general knowledge statements for use in Study 7. These 
included “About one-sixth of the earth’s surface is permanently covered with ice” (false) and 
“Alaska, with 8, is the US state with the most national park sites” (true). Four statements were 
true and 4 were false, ensuring that greater accuracy could not be obtained by generally 
responding true or false. In contrast to Study 4, the general knowledge questions were harder (M 
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accuracy = 51%; SD = 18%). This was intentional in that our focus was on manipulation effects 
rather than pre-existing knowledge (Dijksterhuis et al., 2000). Importantly, however, logical 
reasoning would at least be helpful in classifying the statements as true or false. For example, 
Alaska is a very large state with abundant natural resources and it therefore makes sense that this 
state contains more national parks than other states in the US. Participants typed “t” for true and 
“f” for false.8 
Subsequently, the same moral dilemmas presented in Studies 5 and 6 were presented in 
Study 7 as well, this time in the context of the metaphor-related manipulation of pointing toward 
one body part versus the other. Scenario solutions were presented laterally and required pressing 
the q or the p key of the keyboard. As in prior studies, rational responses to the dilemmas were 
scored as 0, emotional responses were scored as 1, and we then averaged responses across the 
dilemmas (M = .49; SD = .23). 
Results 
We hypothesized that head-pointers, relative to heart-pointers, would exhibit greater 
accuracy when deciding whether general knowledge statements were true or false. This 
prediction was confirmed in a one-way ANOVA, F (1, 72) = 4.16, p < .05, partial eta square = 
.05, a medium effect size (Ms = 47% & 56% for heart- & head-pointers, respectively). When 
controlling for participant sex in a multiple regression, the manipulation effect remained 
significant, b = -.26, t = -2.27, p < .05. 
By contrast, we hypothesized that heart-pointers, relative to head-pointers, would solve 
moral dilemmas in an emotional manner. This prediction was confirmed in a second one-way 
ANOVA, F (1, 72) = 4.06, p < .05, partial eta square = .05, again a medium effect size (Ms = 
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44% & 54% for head- & heart-pointers, respectively). When controlling for participant sex in a 
multiple regression, the manipulation effect remained significant, b = .23, t = 2.02, p < .05. 
Discussion 
Our primary interest in the investigation was individual differences. On the other hand, 
we recognize that manipulation studies are useful in parsing cause and effect. The results of 
Study 7 are therefore important in showing that drawing attention to the head facilitates 
intellectual problem solving, likely because it leads people to reason through the problems to a 
greater extent. By contrast, drawing attention to the heart leads to weighting emotional over 
rational factors in decision making, likely because it increases the salience of one’s feelings 
when deciding what one would do. Based on additional results from Studies 1-6, we advocate 
metaphor-related manipulations of the present type in understanding experiential thinking (which 
should be increased by heart-pointing), interpersonal coldness (which should be increased by 
head-pointing), and emotional reactivity (which should be increased by heart-pointing). 
There was no control condition in Study 7 in the sense that both the head- and heart-
pointing conditions were theory-relevant. A control condition would have been difficult to 
instantiate in the context of the cover story (i.e., precluding the use of the dominant hand by 
placing it on a portion of the body). Further, Studies 1-6 found that, in the absence of a 
manipulation, people differ in their self-locations and therefore a control condition in Study 7 
would arguably have been messy from a self-location perspective. In addition, the manipulation 
provided maximal power in relation to two body organs that are metaphorically linked to quite 
different functions and outcomes (Swan, 2009). All such points aside, we can see the value to 
control conditions in designs of the Study 7 type and therefore advocate them in understanding 
the unique effects of head- versus heart-pointing in future studies. 
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 Study 8  
 Study 6, in the examination of daily outcomes assessed at least 3 days later, argues in 
favor of the predictive validity of self-locations over time. Nonetheless, we recognize that the 
delay between the completion of the self-location measure and the daily outcomes consisted of 
weeks at most. Accordingly, Study 8 sought to examine the predictive validity of self-locations 
over a longer period of time. In addition, the Study 8 protocol also sought to assess the stability 
of self-locations themselves. We hypothesized that self-locations would be consistent over a very 
long time period and, more importantly, hypothesized that individual differences in self-location, 
assessed at time 1, would predict multiple personality-related variables – those also assessed in 
Study 3 – at time 2, almost a year later. Results of this type would greatly extend the idea that 
self-locations are dispositional in nature. We do mention that the sample size for this study was 
not large, but that the findings represented an important inclusion to the paper. 
Method 
Time 1 Assessment 
 Participants from NDSU initially completed a number of measures and tasks in 
laboratory sessions of 6 or less. Whether people located the self in the head or the heart was not 
of theoretical interest to the study proper, but – fortunately – this measure had been administered. 
The item was exactly that described in Studies 1-6. At time 1, 58% of the participants located the 
self in the heart. Additionally, there was a sex difference consistent with prior studies such that 
the percentage of woman who were heart locators (72%) was larger than the percentage of men 
who were heart locators (46%), χ² = 12.59, p < .01. 
Time 2 Assessment 
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 Participants were contacted by email at least 282 days subsequent to completing the 
initial laboratory session. No mention was made of self-locations and, in fact, these participants 
had completed a large number of measures at time 1. Participants were asked whether they 
would complete a “follow-up” study, which was entirely voluntary, but would be compensated 
by $7. Three email reminders were sent, which ultimately resulted in a time 2 sample size of 36 
(22 female), a small minority of the time 1 sample. These participants completed a survey over 
the Internet using Survey Monkey. 
 The time 2 outcomes consisted of the emotional (M = 3.71; SD = .97; Alpha = .86), 
logical (M = 4.08; SD = .79; Alpha = .84), warmth (M = 4.17; SD = .91; Alpha = .93), coldness 
(M = 1.77; SD = .93; Alpha = .88), and agreeableness (M = 4.08; SD = .77; Alpha = .90) scales 
of Study 3, exactly as administered in that study. Participants had to make all of these ratings and 
then had to press enter to go to the final screen. On the final screen, and for purposes of 
analyzing test-retest stability rather than outcome prediction, the self-location measure was 
completed again. 
Results 
Consistency in Self-Locations across Time 
 We classified people as consistent in their self-locations across time or as switchers. 
There was a larger number of people who remained consistent (27) rather than switched (9) their 
self-locations, χ² = 9.00, p < .01, Cramer’s V = .50. Thus, perceived self-locations are generally 
consistent even across a very long time frame. 
Outcome Prediction 
 An important question in personality psychology is whether assessments at one time can 
predict time 2 outcomes even when there is a long intervening time interval (Ozer & Benet-
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Martinez, 2006). In the present context, this is a conservative analysis strategy because we know 
that a small minority of individuals did switch their self-locations and the time 2 self-location 
measure was more contemporaneous with the outcome measures. We do note that the results 
below are even stronger when switchers are excluded and are substantially the same when the 
time 2 self-location measure is used instead. Nonetheless, we chose to report the results of the 
most conservative test – i.e., the time 1 self-location measure predicting the time 2 outcomes, 
with the entire sample included. 
 The sample size was not large, however, and we therefore sought to increase power when 
it made sense to do so. The emotional and logical outcomes form a pair as do the warmth and 
coldness outcomes. For each of these pairs of outcomes, moreover, we predicted a cross-over 
interaction. For example, heart-locators should score higher on the emotional scale, whereas 
head-locators should score higher on the logical scale. For these pairs of outcomes, then, we 
performed mixed-model ANOVAs. The between-subjects factor was self-location and the 
within-subject factor was scale (e.g., emotional versus logical). 
 In contrasting emotional and logical personality attributes, the main effect for Self-
Location was not significant, F < 1. The Scale factor was significant, F (1, 34) = 5.51, p < .05, 
partial eta square = .14, in that scores for the logical scale were higher (M = 4.11) than the scores 
for the emotional scale (M = 3.61) in the sample as a whole. Of more importance, there was a 
Self-Location by Scale interaction, F (1, 34) = 8.05, p < .01, partial eta square = .19. Means for 
this interaction are reported in the top panel of Figure 2. As shown there, and as hypothesized, 
there was a cross-over interaction such that heart-locators reported themselves to be more 
emotional, whereas head-locators reported themselves to be more logical. In a follow-up multiple 
regression, we created an emotional minus logical difference score and then entered the self-
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location and participant sex variables. Both Self-Location, b = .38, t = 2.54, p < .05, and 
Participant Sex, b = .34, t = 2.31, p < .05, predicted tendencies to view oneself as more emotional 
than logical with overlap among these predictors controlled. 
 In contrasting warmth and coldness, there was again no main effect for Self-Location, F 
< 1. As might be expected, however, warmth scores (M = 4.06) were higher than coldness scores 
(M = 1.87), F (1, 34) = 70.87, p < .01, partial eta square = .68, as warmth is the more normative 
personality attribute (Wiggins & Trapnell, 1996). There was also a Self-Location by Scale 
interaction, F (1, 34) = 12.18, p < .01, partial eta square = .26. The relevant means are displayed 
in the bottom panel of Figure 2. As shown there, warmth scores were higher among heart-
locators and coldness scores were higher among head-locators. In a follow-up multiple 
regression, we created a warmth minus coldness difference score and then treated it as a 
dependent measure in a multiple regression. Self-location was a strong predictor, b = .89, t = 
3.31, p < .01, whereas Participant Sex was not, b = .13, t = 0.57, p > .60. 
 Agreeableness was not paired with any other personality attribute and we therefore 
conducted a simpler one-way ANOVA in examining this outcome. The main effect for Self-
Location was significant, F (1, 34) = 5.19, p < .01, partial eta square = .25. As hypothesized, and 
even after a long intervening interval, heart-locators scored higher in agreeableness (M = 4.39) 
than head-locators did (M = 3.61). A multiple regression revealed that Self-Location remained a 
significant predictor of agreeableness with participant sex controlled, b = .37, t = 3.15, p < .01, 
whereas Participant Sex was a non-significant predictor, b = .08, t = 0.69, p > .45. See Table 5 
for correlations among the Study 8 variables. 
Discussion 
Self-Location 42 
 
 Study 8 was conducted to establish self-location as a trait-like variable. A trait-like 
variable should exhibit stability over time. Self-location passed this test in that the vast majority 
of people remained consistent in their perceived self-locations across a substantial time interval. 
Of more importance, we were able to show that self-locations, assessed at time 1, predicted 
outcomes at time 2, at least 282 days later. The pattern of these results was conceptually identical 
to that of Study 3, but in the Study 8 case, we could rule out state-related influences and potential 
order effects among the predictor and outcome measures. For example, having reported oneself 
as a heart person, one might then be more inclined to characterize the self as emotional 
subsequently. Such concerns cannot characterize the Study 8 findings owing to the procedures 
used. Although the sample size of Study 8 was not large, its conclusions are important in making 
a case for the trait-like nature of individual differences in self-location. 
General Discussion 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) made a case for the idea that people think rather than merely 
talk in metaphoric terms. Importantly, when people conceptualize emotionality and rationality, 
they frequently do so through the use of heart versus head metaphors (Kövecses, 2000; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999; Swan, 2009). Accordingly, we reasoned that asking individuals to locate the self 
in the head versus the heart would have considerable value in understanding a metaphoric source 
of differences between individuals. Women, relative to men, think of themselves as more 
emotional beings (Robinson & Clore, 2002) and there is empirical evidence for the point that 
women score higher on emotionality scales (Larsen & Diener, 1987). A first hypothesis was 
therefore that women would locate the self in the heart to a greater extent. This pattern was 
robust across studies, a result that would seem to possess considerable value to the sex 
differences literature. 
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Of more importance, the self-location measure predicted an extensive set of outcomes, 
generally so with participant sex controlled. Study 1 found that heart-locators were more 
affectively intense, more psychologically feminine, and liked intimacy-related activities to a 
greater extent. Study 2 found that heart-locators paid greater attention to their emotions. In 
addition, Study 2 found that head-locators liked thinking rationally, whereas heart-locators liked 
thinking in experiential terms. Study 3 found that head-locators were more logical and cold, 
whereas heart-locators were more emotional and warm. Heart-locators also scored higher in 
agreeableness. Study 4 found evidence for the idea that head-locators could be characterized as 
more intellectually capable. Study 5 found that moral dilemmas were solved in a more emotional 
(versus rational) manner among heart-locators than head-locators, a result replicated in Study 6. 
Study 6 additionally demonstrated that the self-location measure predicts reactivity to events in 
everyday life: Head-locators exhibited greater antisocial behavior on high provocation days and 
heart-locators experienced greater negative emotion on high stressor days. Study 7 manipulated 
attention to the head versus the heart in an experimental manner. Head-pointing facilitated 
general knowledge performance, whereas heart-pointing led to emotional responding to moral 
dilemmas. Study 8 supported the dispositional nature of self-locations, in that they predicted 
several outcomes at a much later time. The findings are extensive and we discuss them in 
relation to remaining questions, implications, and future research directions. 
Head versus Heart Metaphors 
The self-locations involved are metaphoric in nature. The self is an entity that requires 
both a head and a heart. Literally speaking, then, there cannot be head people versus heart 
people. In addition, the heart does not have the capacities metaphorically assigned to it. For 
example, it does not solve moral dilemmas, nor does it view social interactions more 
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benevolently. We doubt that heart-locators have “bigger” hearts or hearts that function 
differently. Rather, for both head- and heart-locators, the heart serves the same bodily functions. 
One might wonder whether heart-locators have greater awareness of how fast their hearts are 
beating, but in fact people typically perform at chance level in heartbeat detection tasks 
(Pennebaker & Hoover, 1984; Phillips, Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 1999). For such reasons, we do 
not think that there are physiological differences that can account for why some people locate the 
self primarily in the head, whereas others do so primarily in the heart. 
Nonetheless, such self-locations were widely predictive of outcomes consistent with head 
versus heart metaphors, further support for the metaphoric nature of such self-locations. In this 
respect, our findings encourage further systematic investigations of the manner in which people 
conceptualize the self in terms of its bodily features (Burris & Rempel, 2004; Robinson et al., 
2006). For example, asking individuals whether their mouths or genitals figure more prominently 
in their self-conceptions might reveal and predict important individual differences according to 
psychodynamic thinking, which ascribes different personality attributes to “oral” versus 
“genital” types of people despite the questionable physiological basis of this personality type 
distinction (Bornstein, 2005). 
In creating the self-location measure, we sought simplicity and directness. Only one item 
was administered because there seemed only one direct way to ask the question without being 
redundant. The responses were “brain” versus “heart” because both the brain and the heart are 
internal body organs, unlike the head. It is an empirical question whether a modified self-location 
measure involving the “head” versus the “heart” would produce parallel findings, but there is 
every reason to believe that it would based on prominent metaphors (Swan, 2009). It seemed best 
to use dichotomous response options in order to maximally contrast head versus heart metaphors 
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and therefore the clarity of the findings and their interpretation. Indeed, as mentioned in the 
introduction, this was a deliberate strategy for translating metaphor representation theory to the 
realm of individual difference assessment. In addition, the head and the heart are discrete organs 
that are spatially separated and ratings (e.g., on a 1 to 7 scale, is your self more in the head or 
more in the heart?) would have produced ambiguity. Would an intermediate (e.g., 4) rating mean 
that the self is in the throat, both organs equally, or that the participant failed to seriously 
consider the question? By forcing choices, such ambiguities were avoided. We note that Study 8 
provides support for the consistency of self-locations over time and therefore the measure. 
The self-location measure did not ask people what sorts of personality traits they have – 
whether related to emotionality, femininity, etc. In this important sense, the measure is truly 
unique and attests to the power of conceptual metaphor in how people understand themselves 
and, by extension, their personality attributes. Nonetheless, the reader may wonder whether the 
self-location measure is a measure of some particular sort of self-reported trait. Certainly, it does 
predict a number of personality traits, as we show, yet it cannot be viewed as synonymous with 
any of them. Correlations were often moderate, but more to the point no existing trait can 
account for the diversity of outcomes predicted. For example, personality traits are largely, if not 
entirely, non-predictive of cognitive ability (Demetriou, Kyriakides, & Avraamidou, 2003) and 
yet head-locators appear higher in cognitive ability than heart-locators as well as differing in 
their personalities. Heart-locators were more emotional and more interpersonally warm yet these 
are very different personality attributes (Jang et al., 2001; Wiggins & Trapnell, 1996). Similarly, 
head-locators were more logical, but also colder. These are entirely distinct outcomes from a 
factor analytic perspective (McCrae & Costa, 1999). 
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More particular questions can be asked. Is self-location a measure of emotionality? Yes, 
but it is not just this. A trait-related measure of emotionality would not typically predict liking 
for intimacy, attention to emotion, agreeableness, or cognitive ability. Moreover, Study 3 showed 
that heart-locators were more emotional even after controlling for neuroticism, which in fact was 
not significantly higher among heart-locators. Is self-location a measure of impulsivity? No, it is 
not. Aside from the fact that we have not found such relationships in unpublished data, Study 3 
of the present investigation reports that heart-locators are more thoughtful about their feelings 
and this is not true of impulsive individuals (Cyder & Smith, 2008). Can the self-location 
measure be conceptualized in terms of the need for cognition? We might expect some such 
relationship on the basis of the rational engagement outcome of Study 3. Regardless, this 
correlation was modest enough to suggest some independence of these constructs. Of more 
importance, and again, need for cognition would not predict the diversity of outcomes obtained 
across the present studies. For example, it would not predict lower levels of attention to emotion 
(Study 2), lesser agreeableness (Studies 3 & 8), or aggressive responses to provocations in daily 
life (Study 6). 
Even so, it is useful to consider some broader issues concerning the nature of metaphor, 
and how it operates, in relation to the present findings. Conceptual metaphors might typically be 
used to understand abstract concepts in terms of concrete entities or perceptions (Landau et al., 
2010). The self is an abstract concept, whereas the head and the heart are concrete body organs 
used to think about the self’s attributes. Yet, the nature of such mappings is slightly different 
than is the case with other metaphors. The meanings ascribed to the head (e.g., it is intelligent) 
and the heart (e.g., it is emotional) appear more inferential than is the case for most other 
metaphoric source domains (e.g., it is black or it is white). In addition, the self is in part 
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composed of its body organs and therefore a self-to-organ mapping does not involve the same 
sort of dissimilarity that characterizes some other metaphors (e.g., what is moral is clean). In this 
sense, the self-location metaphor can be considered an instance of metonymy, whereby attributes 
of a part (e.g., the heart) are used to conceptualize the whole (i.e., the self). Scholars agree, 
however, that metonymies are metaphorically motivated (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
That self-locations are metaphorically motivated cannot be doubted given the ubiquity of 
linguistic expressions referring to the head or the heart in characterizing people (e.g., “she has a 
good heart”). 
Toward a Metaphor-Enriched Personality Psychology 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) contended that people think, feel, and behave in metaphoric 
terms. This was a largely theoretical statement rather than one based on empirical sources of 
data. Since then, a body of social cognitive work has shown that perceptual manipulations 
consistent with prominent metaphors (e.g., “good is up”: Meier & Robinson, 2004a) alter 
cognition and social judgments in a metaphor-consistent direction (Landau et al., 2010). There 
are many gaps in our current knowledge, but the primary one from our perspective is that 
metaphor representation theory has yet to contact the personality literature as much as might be 
desired (Robinson & Fetterman, in press), aside from a handful of studies examining personality 
trait predictors of reaction time processes (Meier & Robinson, 2006; Moeller, Robinson, & 
Zabelina, 2008; Robinson, Zabelina, Ode, & Moeller, 2008; Sherman & Clore, 2009). Yet, if 
metaphoric processes do constrain thought, feeling, and behavior in the manner suggested by 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999), the metaphor representation perspective might have largely untapped 
potential in understanding individual differences. 
Self-Location 48 
 
Lakoff (1986) suggested that metaphors are consensually shared by members of a culture. 
If so, and a unique contribution of our investigation, metaphors should be pitted against each 
other in understanding individual differences. This was the exact rationale for our self-location 
measure, which forced individuals to choose the head versus the heart as the primary locus of the 
self. It was notable that a relatively equal proportion of individuals chose each self-location. It 
was further notable that there were robust sex differences in self-location. Finally, and most 
impressively, was the fact that individual differences in self-location predicted such a diversity of 
outcomes in a metaphor-consistent direction. For example, head-locators were more rational, 
interpersonally colder, and more intelligent in objective terms. By contrast, heart-locators were 
more emotional, interpersonally warmer, and favored emotional over rational considerations in 
resolving moral dilemmas. 
More or less, we think that we have solved a significant problem in translating metaphor 
representation theory (Meier & Robinson, 2005) to the personality and individual difference 
realm. If metaphors are consensually shared (Lakoff, 1986), diametrically opposite – but both 
common – metaphor-relevant items should be pitted against each other and people should be 
forced to choose which better characterizes the self or its preferences. We envision considerable 
progress on the basis of extensions of this method. For example, preferences for white versus 
black should possess relevance in understanding individual differences in positively valenced 
thoughts (Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004), morality (Sherman & Clore, 2009), and perhaps 
interpersonal functioning (Frank & Gilovich, 1988). Similarly, we would expect preferences for 
the color red over blue to predict anger and aggression (Fetterman, Robinson, Gordon, & Elliot, 
2011). Indeed, we regard a metaphoric approach to personality as an especially generative one in 
answering important questions concerning how and why people differ from each other (Robinson 
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& Fetterman, in press), particularly given the extensive corpus of linguistic metaphors collected 
and analyzed by metaphor scholars (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
Further, the present findings offer hints of what we might find in extensions of a 
metaphoric approach to personality. The self-location measure predicted a plethora of outcomes 
that would likely not themselves be related to each other. Yet, the findings make metaphoric 
sense. The heart is often invoked to understand both emotionality and warmth (Swan, 2009) and 
it was likely for this reason that heart-locators scored higher in both. Metaphors for the head, by 
contrast, emphasize both its logic and the idea that thinking with the head (at least relative to the 
heart) might represent a colder mode of interacting with others (Swan, 2009), despite the fact 
that cold people are not typically more logical (Wiggins & Broughton, 1991). Metaphors have 
shades of meaning, that is, that do not necessarily possess internal coherence in any traditional 
sense (Kövecses, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). If so, metaphor-informed assessments of 
personality are also likely to partition the realm of individual differences in a quite different 
manner than standard psychometric approaches to personality assessment. For example, a 
preference for higher (relative to lower) vertical positions may predict greater levels of both 
dominance and spirituality despite the fact that dominance and spirituality are very different 
entities (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007). 
Our approach to personality assessment was explicitly guided by metaphor representation 
theory. Intuitively, however, personality scholars have wittingly or unwittingly often 
conceptualized personality in metaphoric terms. Consider the interpersonal circumplex. Its 
agreeable-disagreeable axis is labeled warmth-coldness (Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988), a 
metaphor. The vertical axis (dominance-submission) is not metaphorically labeled, but 
dominance is depicted as up and submission is depicted as down, a metaphoric mapping for 
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dominance and submission (Schubert, 2005). In the personal relationships literature, a prominent 
scale conceptualizes relationships in terms of their “closeness” (Berscheid, Snyder, & Omoto, 
1989), another metaphor (Williams & Bargh, 2008b). Such scales do not include many items that 
are defined in terms of metaphor, although they include some. The present findings would seem 
to encourage a wider appreciation for the potential role that prominent metaphors have in 
thinking about the self and others and in personality assessment. 
Additional Future Research Directions and Conclusions 
Although we reported a substantial number of findings, there are additional research 
directions that can be pursued. For example, Study 1 suggests that heart-locators should be more 
reactive to emotional inductions in the laboratory. Studies 3 and 6 suggest that heart-locators 
may exhibit lesser aggression to laboratory provocations. Studies 5 and 6 suggest that head-
locators may exhibit rational decision making in other realms than investigated. For example, 
head-locators might exhibit better self-control in paradigms assessing delay of gratification 
(Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989) or delayed discounting (Odum, Baumann, & Rimington, 
2006). On the other hand, the findings of Study 2 suggest that heart-locators might exhibit better 
emotional intelligence in tasks designed to assess it (Bechara, 2004; Moeller, Robinson, 
Wilkowski, & Hanson, 2012). If individual differences in self-location are as consequential as 
we suspect they are, all of these future research directions can be advocated. 
Head and heart metaphors appear to be prominent in many cultures (Kövecses, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the specific shades of meaning involved may vary somewhat from culture to 
culture. For example, consider that we found heart-locators to be both more emotional and 
friendlier (e.g., agreeable), results that make sense if one views feeling as a necessary basis for 
interpersonal warmth (Stearns & Stearns, 1994). It is quite possible, however, that heart 
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metaphors for one culture might emphasize emotionality to a greater extent than friendliness, 
whereas heart metaphors for another culture might emphasize friendliness to a greater extent 
than emotionality. At least with respect to some outcomes, self-locations in the heart might result 
in discrepant outcomes across such cultures. In cultures primarily viewing the heart in terms of 
emotionality, heart-locators may score higher in anger; by contrast, in cultures primarily viewing 
the heart in terms of friendliness, heart-locators may score lower in anger. Cross-cultural studies 
of this type would be most welcome (Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 2005; Lakoff, 1986). 
Our primary focus was individual differences. We do not apologize for this primary 
focus. On the other hand, we admit that our findings were primarily correlational in nature. It is 
possible, and certainly consistent with metaphor representation theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), 
that rational individuals view themselves as head-centric beings because they are rational and 
that emotional individuals view themselves as heart-centric beings because they are emotional. 
On the other hand, Study 7 reported some evidence for the idea that differential attention to the 
head versus the heart has causal consequences. Whether manipulations of this type would 
influence other outcomes than examined – such as emotional reactivity (Gross, Sutton, & 
Ketelaar, 1998), altruistic behaviors (Batson, Ahmad, Lishner, & Tsang, 2002), or aggressive 
behaviors (Bettencourt et al., 2006) – is yet to be determined. In addition, we have yet to discern 
the extent to which self-locations vary by context. It is certainly possible that self-locations 
would shift by context. For example, we might expect people, overall, to be more head-located 
while in class or studying, and heart-located while interacting with friends or family. Work of 
this type is underway. 
Regardless, individual differences exist rather than are manipulated and contextual or 
situational influences on a variable in no way preclude stable dispositional tendencies in relation 
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to that same variable (Block, 2002; Kenrick & Funder, 1988). Further, there are preciously few 
investigations that have sought to use metaphor representation theory to understand individual 
differences, despite the rich possibilities for doing so (Robinson & Fetterman, in press). 
Accordingly, what we particularly emphasize is that a very simple and metaphor-informed 
individual difference item had such widespread value in understanding and predicting sex 
differences, thinking styles, emotionality, interpersonal warmth and coldness, intellectual 
performance, and reactivity to relevant daily elicitors. As a final note, we must emphasize that 
there are benefits and costs to each sort of self-location. Although head-locators appear to be 
smarter, they are colder in their interpersonal functioning. Although heart-locators appear to be 
more agreeable, they are also more emotionally reactive. Thus, and in contrast to some 
personality variables (e.g., neuroticism), the outcomes predicted by the self-location variable, 
across studies, in no way suggest that one sort of self-location is generally more adaptive than 
the other. 
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Footnotes 
 
1The shortened version of Larsen et al.’s (1986) affect intensity measure consisted of 
items 6, 11, 15, 17, 19, 23, 26, 30, 32, and 38. 
 
2
We did not assess psychological masculinity because it is primarily defined in terms of 
qualities such as assertiveness and dominance rather than rationality (Bem, 1974). The shortened 
femininity scale used consisted of items 2, 4, 10, 14, 15, 18, 20, 22, 32, and 40. 
 
3
The full scale is available upon request. 
 
4
We also created a Self-Location by Participant Sex interaction term for this analysis and 
the other outcome measures examined in Studies 1-5. There were only two interactions observed 
across the many outcomes examined. Because this was true, because their nature was not 
particularly informative, and because there are no theoretical reasons for thinking that the 
influence of self-location should vary by sex, interaction terms were omitted from the multiple 
regression analyses reported. 
 
5
Moral dilemmas were chosen from the following website: 
http://www.friesian.com/valley/dilemmas.htm. 
 
6
All of the daily variables exhibited a full range of scores. Skew statistics for all variables 
were acceptable (i.e., skew values < 1.5: Bulmer, 1979). The self-location variable did not 
predict the average frequency of the daily stressor or daily provocation predictors, ps > .15. 
 
7
Both interactions remained significant when controlling for participant sex. 
 
8
The general knowledge statements used in Study 4 and Study 7 are available upon 
request. 
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Table 1 
Correlations among the Study 1 Measures 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure   1  2  3 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Self-Location   
2. Affect Intensity   .37** 
3. Femininity    .48**   .48** 
4. Liking Intimacy   .45**   .60**   .75** 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
** = p < .01; * = p < .05; ^ = p < .10
Self-Location 66 
 
 
Table 2 
Correlations among the Study 2 Measures 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure   1  2  3  4 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Self-Location 
2. Attention to Emotion  .40** 
3. Experiential Engage.  .23*   .51** 
4. Rational Engage.  -.23*   .18*   .12 
5. Openness to Exp.  -.11   .21*   .18^   .53** 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
** = p < .01; * = p < .05; ^ = p < .10
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Table 3 
Correlations among the Study 3 Measures 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure  1 2 3 4 5 6 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Self-Location  
2. Emotional   .27* 
3. Logical  -.24*  .02 
4. Warm   .27*  .40**  .18^ 
5. Cold  -.27* -.18^  .09 -.53** 
6. Agreeable   .33**  .33** -.03  .43** -.39** 
7. Neuroticism -.06  .32** -.09 -.10  .38** -.05 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
** = p < .01; * = p < .05; ^ = p < .10
Self-Location 68 
 
 
Table 4 
Correlations among the Study 4 Measures (Top Panel) and the Study 5 Measures (Bottom Panel) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure   1  2 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Self-Location 
2. General Knowledge  .25* 
3. GPA    .23*   .15 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure   1  2 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Self-Location 
2. Moral Dilemmas   .18* 
3. Conscientiousness  -.08  -.20* 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
** = p < .01; * = p < .05; ^ = p < .10 
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Table 5 
Correlations among the Study 8 Measures 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure  1  2  3  4  5 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Self-Location  
2. Emotional   .49* 
3. Logical  -.16  -.22 
4. Warm   .53**   .64**   .13 
5. Cold  -.45**  -.52**  -.14  -.82** 
6. Agreeable   .50**   .74**   .01   .76**  -.69** 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
** = p < .01; * = p < .05; ^ = p < .10 
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Figure 1 
Top Panel: Relations between Daily Stressors and Daily Negative Emotion among Head- versus 
Heart-Locators, Study 6; Bottom Panel: Relations between Daily Provocations and Antisocial 
Behavior among Head- versus Heart-Locators, Study 6 
Figure 2 
Top Panel: Self-Locations as a Predictor of the Qualities of Emotional versus Logical, Study 8; 
Bottom Panel: Self-Locations as a Predictor of the Qualities of Warmth versus Coldness, Study 8 
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